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payments derived from sharecropping or share-farming.”14
The Eighth Circuit, not surprisingly, also gave short shrift to
the argument that the instructions to Form 4835 (on which
non-material participation share rent income and expenses are
reported) contradicted the statute and should override I.R.C. §
1402(a)(1).
The appellate court also stated that it could not say that the
Tax Court erred in holding that the taxpayer in the three cases
had materially participated under the respective arrangements.
However, the Eighth Circuit was impressed by another
argument, that the lessor-lessee arrangements should stand on
their own, apart from any employment relationship, and that if
the rentals were “consistent with market rates for agricultural
land”15 the rents were not “derived under an arrangement” and,
therefore, self-employment tax was not due.16  Th s, the
Eighth Circuit went beyond the focus up to that time, on the
words “under an arrangement” in Section 1402(a)(1), and
looked at the phrase “derived under an arrangement” in the
statute.
The court remanded the cases to the Tax Court to provide an
opportunity for IRS to show a connection between the rents
and the “arrangement.”
In mid-July, 2002, the Tax Court in a brief opinion,
conceded that the rentals in the three cases were fair market
rentals.17
Other cases
Another case appealable to the Eighth Circuit, Milton v.
Commissioner,18 involves the leasing of land by a family
partnership to a corporation controlled by the same
individuals.  IRS argued that the partnership rental income
was subject to self-employment tax.
A case in New York State, appealable to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, has been docketed in the Tax Court.  That
case, Fowler v. Commissioner,19 involved the rental of land
containing apple trees to a family-owned corporation.  That
case indicates that the Internal Revenue Service is positioned
to challenge in another circuit the Eighth Circuit Court’s
analysis in situations involving the rental of land to a family-
owned entity as tenant.
In conclusion
While the advice to taxpayers potentially subject to
challenge to be careful to set rental rates in keeping with rental
rates in the area for comparable land is still good counsel,
indications that IRS is litigating another case in the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals area suggests that the more general
solutions to the problem continue to be relevant.  Those
solutions include¾ (1) shifting ownership of rental land to the
name of a spouse (who is not involved in the business); (2)
conveying the land to another entity (such as an LLC or LP);
(3) retiring from the business; or (4) seeking a broader
solution through legislative amendment. 20
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY . The Chapter 7 debtors operated a
business which purchased agricultural commodities and was
subject to PACA. Several creditors had claims against the
PACA trust and filed claims in the bankruptcy case. The
bankruptcy trustee filed proceedings to recover preferential
transfers made by the debtors for goods and services provided
by third parties. The trustee negotiated a settlement for an
amount which was paid to the bankruptcy estate. The PACA
trust creditors sought to recover the preferential transfer
amount as part of the PACA trust. The bankruptcy trustee
agreed that the recovered amount was subject to the PACA
trust but argued that the amount should be reduced by the
costs of the recovery. The bankruptcy trustee proposed paying
83 percent of the recovery amount to the PACA trust.
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However, the PACA creditors were not satisfied with the
“bird in the hand” and argued that the entire recovery was
PACA trust property. The dispute resulted in the PACA trust
creditors losing all “the birds in the bush.” The court noted
that the dispute did not arise if the recovered funds were not
PAC trust property; therefore, the court first examined that
issue. The court held that a preferential recovery, in itself, was
not subject to the PACA trust because it was not an
agricultural commodity, was not an inventory of food or other
product derived from an agricultural commodity, and was not
a receivable or proceeds from the sale of a commodity.
Assuming that the preferential transfers were initially funded
from the sale of an agricultural commodity, the court held that
the recovered funds could not be traced to the sale proceeds
because the recovery occurred more than two years after any
agricultural commodity sales by the debtors. The court noted
that the PACA trust did not extend to the general assets of the
preferential creditors unless traceable to the sales of
commodities. The court next examined the authority under the
bankruptcy law for excluding PACA trust assets from the
bankruptcy estate and held that Section 541(d) does not
exclude PACA trust assets which become part of the estate
through the preferential transfer rules because, at the
commencement of the case, the debtors did not have an
interest in the preferential transfer property. The preferential
transfer property can be recovered only by the bankruptcy
trustee and did not arise as estate property until more than one
year after the bankruptcy petition. The court held that the
recovered preferential transfer property was not subject to the
PACA trust and the bankruptcy trustee’s proposal was
improper. In re Churchfield, 277 B.R. 769 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2002).
EXEMPTIONS
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtors, husband and wife,
had farmed for almost 20 years before experiencing financial
difficulties. The wife and then the husband took off-farm jobs
while continuing to farm. The bank first refused to make any
additional operating loans and then threatened foreclosure of
the farm mortgage. The debtors were able to continue farming
by obtaining credit for seed and supplies directly from their
suppliers but filed for Chapter 7 during the crop year. The
crop was harvested post-petition. The debtors both claimed
exemptions for farm machinery as tools of the trade of
farming. The creditors objected to the wife’s exemption,
arguing that the wife did not have an ownership interest in the
equipment and neither debtor was a farmer because the farm
was being foreclosed upon by the bank and the debtors had
more income from nonfarm employment. The court held that
the debtors were farmers on the date of the petition because
the debtors had planted crops and harvested them post-
petition. Although the debtors were likely to lose their land,
the debtors had arranged for renting farm land from relatives
and third parties. The court also noted that the proceeds of
those crops exceeded their wages from off-farm employment.
The court also noted that the off-farm income was used to
support the farm and was used to pay farm expenses in excess
of revenues. The court held that the wife had an ownership
interest in the farm equipment because (1) the equipment was
purchased with general farm income which she helped to
produce; (2) the wife co-signed all loans used to purchase the
equipment; and (3) the debtors shared all property as family
property. The court noted that the exemption statute, Kan.
Stat. § 60-2304(e), did not set a minimum ownership
requirement. The creditors also argued that, if the debtors co-
owned the farm equipment, they formed a partnership and the
equipment was not eligible for the exemption as partnership
property. The court held that co-ownership of property by a
husband and wife did not form a partnership without other
indicia of intent to form a partnership, which were not present
here. In re Lampe, 278 B.R. Bankr. 10th Cir. 2002).
FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtors had income for 1996 and
claimed that they filed an income tax return for that year but
had no proof of the filing. The IRS prepared a substitute
return for 1996 and made an assessment of taxes based on that
return in 1998. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 in 2001 and
sought to have the taxes for 1996 declared dischargeable. The
court held that, because the debtors had no proof of filing
other than their testimony, the taxes were nondischargeable.
In re Crump, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,562
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtor was a
corporation which filed two bankruptcy cases, a Chapter 11
case and a Chapter 7 case three years later. In the Chapter 11
case,  Bankruptcy Court approved estate expenses for
professional fees. The debtor claimed these expenses as net
operating losses, carried back three years and as capitalized
expenses. After filing the second Chapter 7 case, the debtor
filed an amended return and carried the capitalized costs as
net operating losses back 10 years under I.R.C. § 172(f) as a
“specified liability loss” resulting from the first bankruptcy
cas . The debtor argued that the fees were eligible for the
special 10 year carryback because the fees arose under the
bankruptcy law. The court held that the connection between
the b kruptcy law and the fee expenses was too attenuated to
qualify as required by law. The court noted that while the fees
were authorized by the bankruptcy law, there was no
requirement that fees be paid and the amount of the fees was
conting nt until the bankruptcy court approved them.
Standard Brands Liquidating Creditor Trust v. United
St t s, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,565 (Fed. Cls.
2002).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFSET. The plaintiffs were a
corporation, family trust and partnership which operated
farms. In each case, a government farm program payment to
the entity was reduced by an offset of money owed personally
by a shareholder, member or partner to the CCC or USDA.
Under its interpretation of the regulations, the USDA gave
notice of the offset to the individuals but not to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs argued that the no-notice to non-debtors policy
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violated their due process rights. The District Court dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative appeals, as
required by 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e). The court held that the statute
did not prohibit judicial review of the USDA action because
the exhaustion statute merely reiterated the exhaustion
requirement and did not specifically prohibit judicial review
until administrative appeals were exhausted. The court also
noted that the exhaustion doctrine was not required to be
followed where there was a constitutional claim which was
“(1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement, (2)
colorable, and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the
purposes of exhaustion.” The court held that all three
conditions were met: (1) the USDA had no administrative
appeal process for facial constitutional claims against a
regulatory policy, (2) lack of notice was a colorable due
process claim, and (3) exhaustion of the administrative appeal
process would be futile because the National Appeals
Division had no authority over this kind of claim. The USDA
also claimed that the case was moot because it had changed
its policy to provide notice to non-debtors, but the court
refused to dismiss the case because of some evidence that
local USDA offices were not providing notice to non-debtors.
McBride Cotton and Cattle Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d
973 (9th Cir. 2002).
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiffs were sugar beet
growers who had purchased multi-peril crop insurance from
the defendants, various crop insurance companies. The
plaintiffs experienced crop losses from a hard frost and filed
claims with the defendants but the defendants refused to pay
the claims. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court for
contract damages and for violation of the Minnesota
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (MPCF Act). The
defendants moved the case to federal court and the plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand the cases back to state court, arguing
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The
defendants argued that the federal court had diversity
jurisdiction because all of the parties are from different states
and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. The
petitions claimed damages of only $50,000 per plaintiff but
the defendants argued that the total damages, when divided
equally among the plaintiffs, amounted to more than $75,000
per plaintiff. The court rejected this method of determining
the amount in controversy for individual plaintiffs, noting that
several plaintiffs had much less than $75,000 in damages. The
court also refused to separate the plaintiffs with less than the
jurisdictional amount as beyond the authority of the court.
However, the court did accept the defendants’ claim that the
actual damage claims had to be aggregated to include both the
contract damages and the damages sought under the MPCF
Act. In eight of the 10 plaintiffs’ cases, the aggregate of these
damages exceeded $75,000; therefore, the court held that it
had jurisdiction over these plaintiffs’ claims. As to the two
remaining plaintiffs, the defendants argued that a federal
question was involved because the FICA preempted state
court actions. The court held that, although some courts have
held that the FICA preempts state actions, the FICA did not
preempt actions against nongovernmental entities and
individuals. The defendants also argued that a substantial
federal question was involved in that the crop insurance
syst m was highly regulated and that these regulations would
be involved in the case. The court also rejected this argument
and remanded the cases of these two plaintiffs back to state
court. The court noted that the actions did not attack the
federal crop insurance system or regulations but sought
damages for the actions of private companies. Agre v. Rain
& Hail, LLC, 196 F. Supp.2d 905 (D. Minn. 2002).
WAREHOUSES. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
revising the regulations administering the United States
Warehouse Act (USWA) to implement the provisions of the
Grain Standards and Warehouse Improvement Act of 2000
(the 2000 Act). The regulations update federal warehouse
licensing operations, authorize electronic warehouse receipts
for all commodities, and authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to establish regulations for voluntary systems for
other electronic documents related to sales and transfers of
agricultural products. 67 Fed. Reg. 50777 (Aug. 5, 2002).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMER. The decedent’s will provided for the
residue of the estate to pass in trust to the surviving spouse,
with the principal and net income to be distributed for the
spouse’s support, care and welfare. The remainder of the trust
passed to a charitable organization. Within nine months after
the decedent’s death, the spouse disclaimed in writing all of
th  interest in the trust as a discretionary distributee of trust
principal. The trust was then reformed by a local court to
provide for a unitrust amount to the spouse of 6.525 percent
of net fair market value of the trust assets valued annually.
The remainder still passed to the charitable organization. The
IRS ruled that the disclaimer of the interest in the principal
was qualified, the value of the spouse’s unitrust interest was
eligible for the marital deduction, and the reformation of the
trust did not prevent a charitable deduction for the value of
the charity’s remainder interest. Lt . Rul. 200232015, May 1,
2002).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The beneficiaries of the decedent’s
estate discovered that the decedent’s caretakers had
misappropriated funds from the decedent while the decedent
was alive but incapacitated. The beneficiaries sued the law
firm, among others, which handled the decedent’s affairs and
obtained a settlement for return of the legal fees paid to the
firm and for damages resulting from the firm’s malpractice.
The issue was whether and to what extent the recovery from
the law firm was to be included in the decedent’s estate as
representing the value of the claim at the death of the
decedent. The court held that the return of the legal fees was
not included in the value of the decedent’s estate because the
legal services were performed after the decedent’s death for
the estate. As to the main settlement, the court held that the
entire settlement represented the value of the claim but
allowed a deduction for the value of the legal fees expended
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to bring the action and reach the settlement and a deduction
for the costs expended by the beneficiaries in discovering the
lawyers’ malpractice and malfeasance of the caregivers. The
court held that no deduction was allowed for a portion of the
settlement paid directly to the beneficiaries because that
amount would have otherwise passed to the beneficiaries from
the estate. Estate of Glover v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-
186.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned 62.96
percent of the stock in a family corporation which operated a
heavy equipment rental company. The value of the decedent’s
stock as determined by the Tax Court was based on a
combination of the value the company assets (65 percent
weight) and the earnings of the company (35 percent weight)
because the company was in no danger of liquidation. The
appellate court held that the correct ratio was 85 percent based
on asset value and 15 percent based on earnings value. The
appellate court also allowed a discount of 34 percent of any
built-in gain in the assets’ values. The Tax Court and
appellate court allowed a 15 percent discount for lack of
marketability and 7.5 percent discount for lack of super-
majority control. A super-majority vote was required by the
corporate charter to force the liquidation of the company.
Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,446 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 2000-
12.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayer had
income from wages and claimed deductions for unreimbursed
employee expenses, charitable contributions and state and
local taxes. The taxpayer also claimed the personal
exemption. The taxpayer did not compute alternative
minimum taxable income and paid tax based on the regular
income only. The court held that I.R.C. § 55(b)(2) required
computation of AMTI which did not allow deductions for
unreimbursed employee expenses (under I.R.C. § 67(b)), the
personal exemption, and the deduction for state and local
taxes. Because the taxpayer’s AMTI exceeded the exemption
amount, the taxpayer was liable for AMT on the amount that
the AMTI exceed the exemption amount. Because the AMT
exceeded the regular tax, the taxpayer was liable for the
AMT. Moore v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-196.
AUTOMOBILE EXPENSES . The taxpayer operated a
music entertainment business which involved a band which
performed for a fee. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for
expense method depreciation and travel expenses for the van.
The deductions were disallowed because the taxpayer failed
to provide substantiation of the business use of the van and
the business purpose for the expenses and because the van
was placed in service in a personal activity in a prior taxable
year. Kay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-197.
The taxpayer was employed as a nurse. Initially the taxpayer
worked at a medical facility in the taxpayer’s city of
resi ence. However, the employer assigned the taxpayer to
t mporary employment at the employer’s facilities in other
cities, with the promise that the taxpayer would eventually be
permanently assigned to the facility in the taxpayer’s city of
re idence. When this promise was not fulfilled, the taxpayer
changed to permanent employment in another city. The
taxpayer claimed travel expenses for automobile and other
travel costs for travel to the temporary work sites and
maintained travel logs and other written records of the
expenses. The court upheld the taxpayer’s deductions for the
travel expenses for commuting to the temporary work sites
because the taxpayer demonstrated a business purpose, the
promise of permanent employment, for the location of the
residence and substantiated the expenses with written records.
Daiz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-192.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a music
entertainment business which involved a band which
performed for a fee. The taxpayer claimed deduction for
management fees and for professional convention expenses.
The court disallowed the deduction because the taxpayer
failed to provide substantiation of the business purpose of the
expenses.  Kay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-197.
The taxpayer operated a real estate sales business as a sole
proprietorship and formed a wholly-owned corporation which
operated two retail businesses and a real estate development
business. The taxpayer’s business entered into a management
contract with the corporation in exchange for a fee of the
greater of $48,000 or 70 percent of the net profit of the real
estate sales business. The fee was increased over several years
by amending the management contract. The taxpayer
performed all the management services provided by the
corporation but did not receive any salary or other
compensation. The taxpayer reported the fees as deductions
on Schedule C on the taxpayer’s individual tax returns and
included the fees in income on the corporation’s tax returns.
The court held that the existence of the corporation could be
ignored because the taxpayer performed all the services and
controlled the arrangements that established the management
contract and fee. The evidence demonstrated that the taxpayer
did not perform the services as an employee of the
corporation; therefore, the management contract was ignored
and the payment of the management fee was not deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. Stewart v.
Co m’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-199.
CAPITAL GAINS. The IRS has announced that the
election under § 311(e) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA 97), (as amended by § 314(c) of Pub. L. 106-554 and §
414 of Pub. L. 107-147), to treat certain assets held on
January 1, 2001, as having been sold and then reacquired on
that date is properly made by following the instructions for
Form 4797, Sales of Business Property, or Schedule D,
Capital Gains and Losses, for Form 1040, 1120, 1120S, 1065,
or 1041. Under appropriate circumstances, the IRS will grant
requests to make a late election under § 311(e) of TRA 97 and
this notice under Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1 through
301.9100-3. See Harl, ““Deemed Sales’ of Capital and
Section 1231(B) Assets,” 13 Agric. L. Dig. 113 (2002).
Notice 2002-58, I.R.B. 2002-__.
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CASUALTY LOSS. The taxpayer’s residence was
damaged by a rain and wind storm. The taxpayer received
insurance proceeds and hired a contractor to replace rotten
decking and to install a new roof. The taxpayer claimed a
casualty loss deduction based on the loss of fair market value
of the residence after the storm. However, the taxpayer failed
to present evidence of the fair market value of the residence
before and after the storm; therefore, the court denied the
casualty loss deduction. The taxpayer also sought to justify
the loss on the basis of the cost of repair but also failed to
substantiate sufficient costs above the 10 percent of gross
income limitation. Kay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-197.
DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was divorced from the
mother of the taxpayer’s children, with the mother receiving
custodial rights and entitled to child support payments. The
children lived with the mother for more than one-half of the
tax year. The mother did not sign a statement, either written
or on Form 8332, that she did claim the children as
dependents for federal income tax purposes. The court held
that the taxpayer could not claim the dependency exemption
for the children and the earned income tax credit. In addition,
the court held that the taxpayer could not use the head of
household filing status. Anderson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2002-103.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On July 11, 2002, the President
determined that certain areas in the Federated States of
Micronesia are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of Tropical
Storm Chata'an, which included flooding, mudslides and
landslides, that began on July 2, 2002. FEMA-1427-DR.
Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to
the disaster may deduct them on their 2001 federal income tax
returns.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer had a
credit card account and had written to the credit card company
to verify the balance on the account. The taxpayer then made
a cash withdrawal on that account and made several minimal
payments on the account. The taxpayer and credit card
company disputed several late charges and the interest rate
over several months. The credit card company eventually
offered a substantially reduced amount to settle the account,
which the taxpayer paid. The credit card company issued a
From 1099-C and listed the reduction amount, over $19,000,
as discharge of indebtedness income to the taxpayer. The
credit card company based the amount on the balance shown
on their records as of the settlement date less the settlement
amount paid by the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the
account reduction was not discharge of indebtedness but a
determination of the true balance of the account reached by
negotiation of a disputed claim. The court held that the
taxpayer had discharge of indebtedness income in the amount
of the verified balance plus the cash withdrawal less the
amount of monthly payments made and the final settlement
amount. Earnshaw v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-191.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a physician who also
operated a horse breeding operation in conjunction with an S
corporation, owned in part by the taxpayer, which owned a
farm on which the horses were boarded and trained. The
taxpay r developed a business plan for the breeding operation
which identified advisors, projected income and expenses,
nd included a list of assets with expected appreciation and an
economic analysis of the horse breeding industry produced by
 university. The plan was later amended to change the focus
f om bre ding to racing. The taxpayer was a licensed horse
trainer and a certified horse appraiser. The taxpayer published
articles on various aspects of horse breeding and racing. The
operation, however, produced only losses for its 18 year
existence. The court held that the horse breeding/racing
operation was not operated for profit because (1) the taxpayer
failed to demonstrate that separate and accurate records were
maintained which were sufficient to analyze the efficiency
and profitability of the operation; (2) the operation produced
only losses; (3) the taxpayer had substantial personal income
which was offset by the losses; (4) the taxpayer failed to
provide evidence that any of the business assets would
appreciate in value to offset the losses; and (5) although the
taxpayer was either knowledgeable about horse breeding or
sought expert advice, the taxpayer failed to provide evidence
that the taxpayer had any expertise or sought advice as to how
to make the operation profitable. In its discussion of these
factors, a major concern of the court was the taxpayer’s
failure to provide evidence other than the taxpayer’s own
assertions as to the intent to operate the horse breeding as a
profitable business. The case demonstrates a growing
emphasis on the need of other-income taxpayers with several
years of farm losses to demonstrate that they have made
substantial efforts to restructure the farm business to make it
profitable within a reasonable period of time. The court here
made an observation that if the taxpayer did not have
substantial income from a medical career, the taxpayer would
not, or even could not, have allowed the losses to continue.
Kuberski v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-200.
LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, initially
operated their construction business as a sole proprietorship
and then incorporated the business as a C corporation. The
corporation terminated in 1991 and the business was
terminated. The corporation did not file income tax returns
because the corporation never had a profit. The taxpayers
claimed a Schedule C loss on their individual Form 1040 tax
return for 1995 but did not file a Schedule C. the taxpayers
claimed that the loss resulted from an uncollectible judgment
awarded to the corporation in 1991. However, the taxpayers
presented no explanation as to why the corporation’s loss
could be passed on to them. The taxpayers merely argued that
they had contributed capital to the corporation and should be
entitled to the loss. The primary evidence was a check register
which did not list the bank or bank account involved and
which listed the checks out of numerical order. The court held
that the taxpayers were not entitled to a loss deduction
because the taxpayers failed to provide any evidence that they
suffered a loss. Portaluppi v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2002-106..
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August 2002,
the weighted average is 5.65 percent with the permissible
range of 5.09 to 6.22 percent (90 to 120 percent permissible
range) and 5.09 to 6.78 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible
Agricultural Law Digest 143
range) for purposes of determining the full funding limitation
under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2002-57, I.R.B. 2002-33.
RETURNS. The IRS has posted the following publications
on its web site at www.irs.gov, in the "Forms & Pubs"
section: Publication 3402 (Rev. 7-2002), Tax Issues for
Limited Liability Companies; Form W-2 (Rev. February
2002), Wage and Tax Statement; and Publication 505 (Rev.
December 2001), Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax. These
documents are also available at no charge and can be obtained
(1) by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-
TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676); (2) through FedWorld on the
Internet; or (3) by directly accessing the Internal Revenue
Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-8020.
The IRS has announced changes in the filing locations for
some taxpayers for 2002 paper returns. The IRS has issued an
advance list for tax return preparers; the new addresses will be
included with the tax return packets sent to taxpayers. IR-
2002-92.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations that  allow income
tax return preparers to elect an identifying number as an
alternative to their social security number for purposes of
identifying themselves on returns they prepare. The
regulations do not specify any standards as to the alternative
number but do require individuals who employ other tax
return preparers to use the individual’s employer
identification number. 67 Fed. Reg. 52862 (Aug. 14, 2002).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
ANIMAL FEED. The plaintiff owned a horse breeding
operation and purchased feed from the defendant. The
plaintiff’s horses became sick and an autopsy on one horse
indicated that the ingestion of rat poison was a cause of death.
The plaintiff claimed that the feed sold by the defendant was
contaminated with rat poison and sued for negligence, breach
of implied warranty, strict liability, and violation of the
Virginia Commercial Feed Law and Pesticide Control Act.
The defendant argued that neither law provided for a right of
private action to enforce those laws and that the other claims
were preempted by FIFRA. The court held that the state laws
did not provide for a right of private action and dismissed
those claims. The court also held that the negligence, breach
of implied warranty and strict liability claims were not
preempted by FIFRA because they were not based on any
defect of the label. Southern States Coop., Inc. v. I.S.P. Co.,
198 F. Supp.2d 807 (N.D. W.Va. 2002).
ZONING
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY. The plaintiff applied
for a conditional use permit to construct two hog confinement
facilities for over 6,000 pigs. The county board of
commissioners denied the permit because (1) the facilities
would impact the local roads, create pollution and create
undue risk of offensive odors; (2) the manure spreading
con racts did not accurately identify the land to be used; (3)
the state and county did not have sufficient resources to
monitor the facilities; and (4) the permit would not promote
the public health, safety and welfare. The trial court upheld
the board’s decision and granted the board a directed verdict,
adding a holding that the plaintiff had failed to provide
evidence of attempts to minimize offensive odors. The
plaintiff argued that the performance standards set forth in the
county ordinance were the sole criteria in determining
whether a permit should be granted. The board had considered
other factors and the court held that the permit approval
consideration should involve all relevant factors and not just
the criteria in the performance standards set forth in the
ordinance. However, the court held that factor (3) above was
not a proper consideration for the permit since it was beyond
the control of the plaintiff. The court also held that factor (1)
was not proper if the harm caused to the roads could be
mitigated by conditions attached to the permit. The court held
that, because factor (1) was not fully explored as to mitigating
co ditions and factor (2) was improperly considered, a direct
verdict was improper. The court held that the directed verdict
was also improper because the plaintiff had presented
evidence of how the plaintiff planned to minimize odors and
pollution from the facilities, raising a fact issue as to whether
t se efforts were sufficient to grant the permit. The court
remanded the case back to the board for determinations in
accord with these holdings. I  re Conditional Use Permit
Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 2000). After the
remand the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled
that the denial of the permit was proper because the facility
would produce intense offensive odors. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling as based on substantial
evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. In re Conditional
Use Permit Denied to Meier, 645 N.W.2d 583 (S.D. 2002).
CITATION UPDATES
Walshire v. United States, 288 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2002)
(disclaimers) see p. 89 supra.
IN THE NEWS
GIFTS. An appeal has been filed in Hackl v. Comm’r, 118
T.C. 279 (2002). See Harl & McEowen, “Gifts of Future
Interests,” 13 Agric. L. Dig. 105 (2002).
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
September 24-27, 2002   Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch
business planning. NEW THIS YEAR : On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover agricultural contracts. Your registration fee
includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days), $525 (three
days), and $670 (four days).  The registration fees for    nonsubsc ibers    are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively.
Registration brochures were mailed in June and July. However, complete information and a registration form are available
now on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-
mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
October 17-18, 2002  Spa Resort, Palm Springs, CA
“Farm & Ranch Income Tax” and “Farm & Ranch Estate and Business Planning.”
The seminars are held on Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one or both days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm
and ranch estate and business planning. The registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers     to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days).  The
registration fees for    n nsubscribers    are $200 and $390 respectively.
Registration brochures will be mailed in August. However, complete information and a registration form are available now on
our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to
robert@agrilawpress.com
*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *
SUBSCRIPTION RATE INCREASE
The recent increase in postage rates and increased printing costs over the years have finally forced us to increase the annual
subscription rate for the print version of the Agricultural Law Digest to $110 per year.  This is the first price increase for the
Digest since it began in 1989. The new rates will take effect with the next billing date after July 1, 2002 for each subscriber.
Each billing offers subscribers the option to subscribe to our e-mail version of the Dig st which remains at $90 per year and
which is e-mailed on the Monday before the print version is published. You can beat the rush and change your subscription
now to the e-mail version and we will credit your account with an additional issue for each three print issues remaining on your
subscription. Send an e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com for a free sample or to order the change in subscription.
